Uzbekistan delivered a diplomatic note to the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on June 28, 2012, demanding that its membership be suspended. This is not the first time that Uzbekistan has withdrawn from the CSTO, but this current move attracted particular concern because it happened a relatively bright time for the CSTO – as the organization was making substantial progress on security cooperation and right after Russian President Putin’s visit to Uzbekistan.
I. The Evolution of the CSTO
The Collective Security Treaty Organization was founded on May 14, 2002, evolving from the Commonwealth of Independent States’s (CIS) Collective Security Treaty (CST), which was signed on May 15, 1992. As a security cooperation organization, the CSTO affirms in its Charter that all member states are not permitted to join other military alliances, and that aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all signatories. In order to enhance its crisis management capabilities and effectively defend against traditional security threats, such as foreign military aggression and foreign intervention, as well as increasingly salient non-traditional security threats like terrorism, extremism and nuclear proliferation, the CSTO has become increasingly militarized. This process of militarization has largely been sparked by Russia and can be characterized by the formation of four collective security forces by the Organization.
The creation of four CSTO security forces, especially the establishment of the CSTO peacekeeping force and the new Collective Rapid Reaction Force, indicate that military integration in the CSTO has been enhanced together with the increase of Russian influence in areas formerly part of the Soviet Union.
CSTO’s first collective military force was a sub-regional army that aimed at responding to foreign aggression and achieving collective defense. Based on geographical location, the CSTO divides its member states into three sub-regions: Eastern Europe, Caucasia, and Central Asia. Based on the Collective Security Treaty signed in 1995, it is required for the three sub-regions to establish regional legions mainly targeted at security issues in their own area. The eastern European and Caucasean legions were formed in 1997 and 2000 respectively based on bilateral treaties between Russia and Belarus and between Russia and Armenia. The Central Asian legion, however, has yet to be created due to a lack of political will among all states concerned.
The second collective force – the Central Asia Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CACRRF) – was established in 2001 with its members coming from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. The primary mission of the CACRRF is to combat terrorism and extremism and to safeguard stability and security in Central Asia. Upon its initial formation, the CACRRF had only 1,500 soldiers, but the number has currently reached roughly 4,000 soldiers at present. The army has fulfilled the function of the CSTO Central Asian Legion to a large degree.
The third collective army is the CSTO peacekeeping force, which CSTO member states agreed to create on Oct. 6, 2007. On Dec. 10, 2010, during a CSTO summit meeting held in Moscow, the Organization declared that it would form a peacekeeping force composed of 4,200 members, with constituents being provided by CSTO member states on a volunteer basis.
The fourth troop is the new Rapid Reaction Force and it was formed in 2009. In a CSTO summit meeting held in Moscow on June 14, 2009, five heads of state – from Russia, Kazakhstan, Amenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – signed an agreement to establish the Collective Rapid Reaction Force. Compared with the previous Central Asia Rapid Reaction Force, the new troop is much larger numerically. According to the CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha, until 2011 the Collective Rapid Reaction Force was composed of 19,000 members.1
Although military security is CSTO’s primary concern, the range of its activities has been greatly expanded. Besides promoting military cooperation, the CSTO also has the important political functions to coordinate all member states’ positions on major international affairs and keep contact and maintain cooperation with other international organizations. For example, during the tenth anniversary summit of the CSTO held in Moscow on May 15, 2012, heads of state from all member states issued a joint declaration, delivering their common perspectives on issues like the European anti-ballistic missle (ABM) system, the Libyan situation, Afghanistan and the Iranian nuclear issue. Regarding the latter aspect, the CSTO has established various types of relations with the United Nations, the Organizaion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, all reinforcing the CSTO’s international legitimacy and reputation.
Besides fulfilling its political and military functions, the CSTO has also engaged in diverse coordinating actions in other areas, such as environmental protection, combating drug trafficking, illegal migration, human trafficking, organized crimes, maintaining internet security and coordinating laws of all nations. For instance, to combat drug trafficking, the CSTO has been holding an annual joint operation called “Channel” since 2003. In the sphere of illegal migration, the CSTO has conducted an annual joint operation called “Illegal Migration” since 2006. To maintain network security, the CSTO has initiated a joint operation called “Proxy-2010,” shutting down certain websites that incite extremist views. The enforcement of such joint actions indicates that the functions of the CSTO include not only traditional security areas but also many nontraditional areas, all of which are the important foundations for the organization’s further development.
In light of the CSTO’s recent progress in many areas, Uzbekistan’s suspension of its membership seems to run against the general development trend of the Organization.
II. Why suspend it’s CSTO membership?
Due largely to political competitions between Russia and the United States in Central Asia, Uzbekistan has had a rather complicated relationship with the CSTO. Uzbekistan became one of the 12 members of the CIS when it was formed in 1992. However, Uzbekistan, together with Georgia and Azerbaijan, declared decided to stop renewing the CIS Collective Security Treaty on April 2, 1999, instead joining the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM) on April 24, 1999. Given GUAM’s pro-Western inclination, Uzbekistan’s participation in GUAM and its refusal to join the CSTO were perceived as signs of its alienation from Russia. Upon its founding, the CSTO had only six member states – Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – and Uzbekistan’s non-participation was viewed as its first withdrawal from the CSTO. However, when Uzbekistan was twice under attack from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1999 and 2000 respectively, the country strengthened its connections and cooperation with the CIS, but such this trend was hindered when the U.S. furthered its security cooperation with Uzbekistan in 2001.
After it was accused and sanctioned by the West because of the Andijan massacre of May 2005, Uzbekistan readjusted its foreign policies and chose to alienate itself from the West while getting closer to Russia. Uzbekistan first requested the U.S. army to withdraw from the Karshi-Khanabad air base, then signed the Treaty of Alliance Relations with Russia in November of the same year and became a new participant of the CSTO in August 2006.
Uzbekistan declared the suspension of its CSTO membership not only because it readjusted its foreign policy but also because of recent developments in the CSTO. Specifically, Uzbekistan’s decision to leave the CSTO was made on the basis of the following three factors.
1. Structural Changes at the Top of the CSTO
Developments in Central Asia and the world since 2010 have had substantial impacts on the development orientation of the CSTO. Some important events include the regime change that happened again in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 after its 2005 “Color Revolution” (often referred to as the “Tulip Revolution”), especially the massive ethnic conflicts there in June 2010; the Obama administration’s decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by 2014; the impacts of unrest in West Asia and North Africa on CSTO member states since the end of 2010, causing illegal migrants problems and prompting a surge in public protests, etc. Public protests have swept across Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan since 2010. Though oil workers from Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan did not protest against their central government directly, protesters in the other three countries demanded a regime change. The ethnic conflicts in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, meanwhile, directly challenged the CSTO’s ability to intervene. The Kyrgyz government pled for help from Russia but was turned down. Though its plea for help was not made directly to the CSTO, the Organization’s inability to act exposed its lack of practical power. How to respond to such challenges has thus become a question that CSTO member states are contemplating, also providing an opportunity for the CSTO to improve its legitimacy and action capabilities.
Against the above-mentioned background, the CSTO has been seeking to reform its decision-making mechanism. Inheriting the practices of the Collective Security Treaty, the CSTO adopted the principle of unanimity when making collective decisions. The inclusion of mechanism demonstrates how strongly newly independent states value their independence and sovereignty and how they want to resist foreign interference.
However, the unanimity rule has undermined the operational effectiveness of the CSTO, causing the delay of many important decisions due to opposition from a few states. Russia has long been trying to change this situation, and the break out of various “Color Revolutions” and dramatic regime changes in the Middle East have reinforced this urgency and Russia’s determination to reform the CSTO’s decision-making mechanisms. To Moscow, the CSTO not only needs to respond to security threats from outside; it also needs to effectively handle security and stability issues among its own member states.
At the annual informal CSTO summit held in Dushanbe in August 2011, the former Russian President Medvedev formally proposed to change the CSTO’s decision-making system from unanimity to simple majority so that its effectiveness could be improved. Medvedev also suggested that the CSTO clarify its criteria for providing assistance to countries that are engulfed in domestic turmoil. In the views of Medvedev and the CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha, the CSTO should effectively prevent the occurrence of political unrest, such as the “Color Revolutions” and the chaos in West Asia and North Africa, while clarifying that all of its member states are in CSTO’s “sphere of responsibility” and that its interventions aim at “maintaining constitutional order.”
Uzbekistan openly expressed its objection to Medvedev’s perspectives, creating a chasm in Uzbekistan-Russia relations. Except for Russia’s proposal to reform the CSTO’s decision-making procedure, the CSTO’s other development tendency is to place new limit on its members’ foreign military exchanges. In its Moscow summit held in December 2011, the CSTO passed a new resolution prohibiting its members from allowing foreign states to establish new military bases on their land without the consensus of all members. Although this resolution will not affect foreign bases that are already set up, such as German bases in Termez, Uzbekistan or French bases in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, it does remove the possibility of establishing new foreign military bases in CSTO member states.
Uzbekistan opposed shifts in the CSTO’s decision-making procedure mainly for the sake of safeguarding its national sovereignty. Since its independence, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy has experienced dramatic changes, but its policy objectives have largely remained consistent, focusing on national sovereignty and regime stability. Based on these objectives, Uzbekistan has followed a basic rule when participating in multilateral cooperation; namely, it will participate to a low degree if such cooperation undermines its sovereignty, and it will be more active when it has a definite chance to benefit from such coordination without its sovereignty being impeded. Within the framework of the CIS and the CSTO, Uzbekistan has not taken full part in economic integration but has been more devoted to security cooperation.
This is closely related to the fact that the former sector impinges on Uzbekistan’s economic sovereignty while the latter does not pose a threat to its sovereignty. Russia sought to alter the CSTO’s unanimous decision-making process, a process whose outcome would endow the CSTO with the rights of intervention whenever domestic turmoil broke out in any of its member state, and such an outcome was unacceptable for Uzbekistan. Although not all CSTO members have reached consensus on Russia’s suggestion, it is possible for the amendment to ultimately be passed considering Russia’s large influence on other CSTO states. Such a prospect was a large factor in Uzbekistan’s decision to suspend its CSTO membership.
2. Cooling Uzbek-Russian Relations
The Uzbek-Russian relationship has been cooling down since 2008. First, disputes over water resources in Central Asia caused a rift in Uzbekistan-Russia relations. Tajikistan declared that it was planning to build a large hydraulic power plant in November 2008. Once the plant was constructed, it would naturally intercept some water resources and reduce the water supply for Uzbekistan, which is located downstream.
Such an outcome would threaten the development of Uzbek industries such as cotton planting, which serve as important sources of its national revenue. Uzbekistan therefore requested that Tajikistan consider the potential environmental consequence of building the power plant. Russia was sympathetic to two upstream countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, on this issue, and Russian companies displayed an interest in taking part in the construction process. Therefore, when Uzbekistan and Tajikistan engaged in disputes over the division of water resources, Russia refused to support Uzbekistan, causing the latter to send a diplomatic note to the Euro-Asian Economic Community (EAEC) in October 2011 asking to suspend its membership. 2
Secondly, Uzbekistan is concerned about the reinforcement of Russia’s military presence in Central Asia. In July 2009, Russia was planning to set up a new military base in the Province of Osh in Kyrgyzstan in order to deploy the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force. Russia already had an air base in Kant.
Uzbekistan firmly opposed Russia’s plan. The Uzbek Foreign Ministry stated that “the implementation of such projects on complex and unpredictable territory may give impetus to the strengthening of militarization processes and initiate all kinds of nationalistic confrontations.” It added that “it could lead to the appearance of radical extremist forces that could lead to serious destabilization in this vast region.” Russia’s plan to create the new base was finally aborted due to opposition from the former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Instead, Russia elected to set up a military training center in Kyrgyzstan. Nonetheless, Uzbekistan still worries that the increase in Russia’s military presence in Central Asia will lead to the region’s militarization and the undermining of its security. This is another factor affecting Uzbekistan’s policy towards Russia.
Russian President Putin chose Uzbekistan as the first stop on his Central Asian tour after being re-elected Russian President. In Tashkent, Putin and Uzbek President Islam Karimov signed a “Declaration on the Further Consolidation of Strategic Partnership” and a “Memorandum of Understanding on Further Joint Measures for Uzbekistan’s Accession to the Free Trade Zone Agreement.” Uzbekistan pledged to finish negotiations on its accession to the CIS Free Trade Zone by the end of 2012. Regarding Karimov’s request that Russia play a more important role in Afghanistan after 2014, President Putin did not make any commitments. It is interesting to note that Putin stopped for only a few hours in Tashkent and that his visit was not even mentioned on Uzbek national television news that day. When commenting on Putin’s visit, the Uzbek News Agency stated that the two countries’ “time-tested partnership had already collapsed.” 3 A close Uzbek-Russian relationship is the foundation for Uzbekistan’s active participation in the CSTO, but the Russian-Uzbek split, as demonstrated above, would naturally undermine Uzbekistan’s willingness to take part in the CSTO in any profound manner.
3. Uzbekistan and the West: Promising Future
Western powers have attempted to improve their relations with Uzbekistan since the “Andijan Massacre,” learning that criticizing and interfering in Uzbekistan’s internal affairs undermined their leverage in the Central Asian region. The European Union (EU) lifted its sanctions on Uzbekistan in 2008 and subsequently lifted its arms embargo in 2009 while signing an agreement with Uzbekistan allowing the transport of non-fatal materials to NATO forces in Afghanistan via Uzbekistan. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) resumed its aid to Uzbekistan in June 2008. David Petraeus, former Commander of the United States Central Command, visited Uzbekistan in February 2009 and discussed U.S.-Uzbekistan cooperation to maintain regional security with Uzbek officials. From 2009 to 2010, German Chancellor, the Spanish king and other heads of state from eastern European countries visited Uzbekistan in succession. Since the end of 2011, defense ministers from France, Germany, Poland, Latvia, Great Britain and other states have all visited Uzbekistan. Uzbek President Karimov visited Brussels in Jan. 2011, holding talks with the President of the EU Commission Jose Barroso, NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen and the European Commissioner for Energy in the European Commission Gunther Oettinger. Both sides agreed to set up an EU office in Uzbekistan to discuss the issue of providing assistance to NATO armies in Afghanistan by using Uzbek infrastructure. 4
On September 28, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama called President Karimov to congratulate him on the 20th anniversary since Uzbekistan’s independence. President Obama also requested that the United States Congress resume sending military aid to Uzbekistan.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tashkent on October 23, 2011 to discuss issues relating to the building of a new transfer center in Uzbekistan. All these high-level visits demonstrate that Western states attach great importance to improving relations with Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, it indicates that Uzbek diplomacy has emerged from the shadow of the “Andijan massacre” and regained its maneuvering space. A particularly significant point is that Uzbekistan has become a crucial link in NATO’s “Northern Distribution Network,” which plays a significant role in NATO’s military actions in Afghanistan.
III. Implications
As a large country in Central Asia, the impacts of Uzbekistan’s suspension of its CSTO membership are not yet clear. However, we can make some rough assessments based on the evolution of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy since its independence and based on various new developments in recent times.
1. Challenging National Security Environment
Of recent, the situation in Central Asia has not exactly been tranquil. Kyrgyzstan witnessed a power transition and ethnic confrontations in 2010 while multiple terrorist attacks and oil worker strikes occurred in Kazakhstan in 2011. Moreover, in the southwestern border area of Kazakhstan, some border guards were killed in June 2012 and serious military conflicts erupted in the Khorugh region of Tajikistan in late July.
Although Uzbekistan was not directly affected by the above mentioned events, Uzbekistan has had to face other security challenges due to the overall deterioration and instability across the Central Asian region. According to some reports, about 200 Kazakhs joined extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and are hiding along the Afghan-Pakistani border, which Uzbekistan has tried relentlessly to secure.
The close ties between Kazakhstani terrorists and the IMU indicate that the security of Uzbekistan is closely linked with the security in other Central Asian states. Uzbekistan has suspended its CSTO membership, meaning that it would rely mainly upon its own power to cope with new developments in both domestic and regional situations without a multilateral framework through which it could coordinate with others to tackle regional security threats. Since Uzbekistan has problems in its relations with other Central Asian states, it would face a test when coping with regional security challenges via bilateral mechanisms.
Because of its neighboring proximity to Afghanistan, Uzbekistan’s suspension of its CSTO membership will bring about practical questions about how to react to the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO forces. Besides the continuous worsening of problems such as drug trafficking, organized crime and weapon smuggling, to name just a few, the most serious challenge Uzbekistan is confronted with is the revival of the IMU. Since the West began enforcing the “Operation Enduring Freedom” in October 2001, the IMU has been under heavy strikes but has not been shattered completely. On the contrary, the IMU has continued to fight in places like Afghanistan while recruiting more members through various means. In November 2011, the IMU introduced all kinds of terrorist activities that it conducts in multiple languages, such as Uzbek, Russian, English, German, and Urdu on its website and it has uploaded relevant video clips to influential social networking websites.
All of the IMU’s propaganda initiatives indicate that it is recruiting new members while accumulating strength to be ready for NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. For Uzbekistan, the continuing existence of the IMU and the potential of it conducting terrorist attacks on Uzbekistan remain a serious threat. Given the fact that the Uzbek government has engaged in cross-border attacks against terrorist groups like the IMU before, it could possibly do this again in the future. However, lacking the coordination of a multilateral organization like the CSTO, Uzbekistan’s unilateral cross-border actions may bring about a deterioration in its relations with other neighboring states.
Rapid Deployment Forces of the nations, members of the CSTO, attend a ceremony marking their joint military exercises at the Marshal Bagramian training grounds, close to the Armenian-Turkish border, on September 15, 2012.
2. Impair the CSTO’s Power
Western media normally believe that Uzbekistan’s suspension of its CSTO membership would not have obvious impacts on the development of the CSTO. They have reached such a conclusion mainly based on the following factors. On the one hand, although Uzbekistan has withdrawn from the CSTO, it has not left the CIS. For example, Uzbekistan sent delegates to attend the 62nd meeting of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers in Kaliningrad in July 2012. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan has not withdrawn from the CIS joint air defense system. Therefore, the CIS will remain an important multilateral mechanism for Uzbekistan to tackle regional security threats.
On the other hand, the CSTO has become more unified since Uzbekistan’s withdrawal. Uzbekistan has often obstructed the passing of important decisions within the CSTO, taking advantage of its unanimous decision-making mechanism. Without Uzbekistan, it will be easier for the CSTO to reach consensus on relevant issues. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia have become the key members promoting the CSTO’s development since Uzbekistan’s exit. Although both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are facing some challenges in their bilateral relations with Russia this year (both related to Russian military bases on their territory), their positions will not cause serious problems for the CSTO’s development, given Russia’s profound influence in the organization. Based on the above-mentioned factors, Western observers believe that Uzbekistan’s temporary withdrawal from the CSTO is a win-win choice for itself and the Organization: Uzbekistan guarantees its freedom to act while the CSTO has gained a newfound cohesion.
The above mentioned views do not truly reflect the concerns of Russia and the CSTO. As a regional power, Uzbekistan’s absence from the CSTO will inevitably impose negative effects on the Organization. Firstly, it is a sign that the CSTO’s influence is not prominent enough. Secondly, Uzbekistan’s leave makes it impossible for the CSTO to obtain Uzbek coordination when promoting cooperative measures in Central Asia, thus reducing the effectiveness of any measures that relate to Uzbekistan. Finally, Uzbekistan’s move restrains Russia’s influence. Initially, the Russian government took a rather restrained and cautious attitude towards Uzbekistan’s suspension of its CSTO membership.
For example, Moscow did not denounce Uzbekistan for its decision, instead emphasizing that further observation is necessary to explain its choice and that the CSTO’s development relies on the consensus of its member states. When being asked about the potential impacts of Uzbekistan’s exit on July 5, 2012, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov noted that this would not affect the CSTO’s development, adding that it would also not seriously affect the security of Central Asia. However, with the passing of time, senior officials from the CSTO and Russia are changing their assessments of the potential impacts of Uzbekistan’s move. CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha stated on August 1st, 2012, “I think Uzbekistan’s exit (from the CSTO) will undoubtedly bring negative effects since it would no longer take part in collective actions for stabilizing the situation in Central Asia.”5 In an article published in Independent Military Review, Russian Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Nikolai Makarov, pointed out that Uzbekistan’s decision will undermine the CSTO’s future operating capabilities. Some critical and relatively modern military bases and facilities are located on Uzbek territory.
Although the CSTO has not utilized these bases and facilities yet, Uzbekistan’s suspension of its CSTO membership means that the CSTO will be unable to use them even in emergency cases. Uzbekistan’s suspension of its CSTO membership may indeed increase the cooperative efficiency and internal cohesion of the CSTO, only at the cost of lowering the CSTO’s status in Central Asia and beyond, all while undermining its capability to respond to the complicated situations in Central Asia and Afghanistan.
3. Intensifying U.S.-Russian Competition in Central Asia
Uzbekistan’s suspension of its CSTO membership may not necessarily only target Russia. On July 31, 2012, the Uzbek Legislative Chamber approved a bill submitted by President Karimov entitled “The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan.” The bill prohibits the stationing of foreign military bases and facilities on its territory but reserves the right to enter into alliances and enter other interstate organizations or withdraw from them, guided by Uzbekistan’s national interests. Such a provision may help dispel Russia’s concern about Uzbekistan allowing the U.S. to set up new military bases on its territory. However, Russia’s suspicion may also remain since the bill reserves room for Uzbekistan to strengthen its cooperation with the West. In fact, various signs since July 2012 suggest that Russia has been taking actions to enhance its military presence in Central Asia while improving its friendly relations with other Central Asian states. First, in July 2012, Russia and Kazakhstan held a joint military exercise in the southeastern region of Kazakhstan, aiming to test their joint capability to cope with terrorist attacks. Second, the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force held a five-day military exercise in Chelyabinsk along the Russian-Kazak border in August 2012, with over 1,000 soldiers and officers from Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan participating. The objective of the exercise was to test their joint ability to repulse attacks from well-equipped crime organizations.
Moreover, Kyrgyzstan openly declared its intention to join the tariff union that comprises Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyz President Atambayev approved the CSTO Charter on July 31, 2012, which was revised during the CSTO Summit held in December 2010. Lastly, Russia has been actively trying to extend a leasing agreement for its military base in Tajikistan to deploy its 201st Motorized Infantry Division. Since Russia has crucial bargaining chips (there are lots of Tajiki laborers in Russia and Tajikistan depends heavily on Russian oil products) while Tajikistan needs Russia’s help to cope with its complicated domestic security situation (the military conflicts that broke out in Khorugh in the end of July), both sides signed an agreement on October 5, 2012 agreeing to extend Russia’s lease on its military base for the 201 Division until 2042.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has also taken lots of measures dedicated to improving its relations with Central Asian states. First, America sent a delegation to visit Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in July 2012. According to Russian media reports, U.S. delegates and Tajikistan officials discussed the question of setting up a military base there.
Second, on the same day that Putin visited Uzbekistan, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen declared that NATO had reached agreements with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to open up a transit route reverse of the “Northern Distribution Network” so that materials could be shipped from Afghanistan to the West through these three Central Asian states.
Moreover, Robert Blake Jr., American Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, noted that the U.S. supported Kazakhstan and Tajikistan’s accession to the WTO and promised to sustain U.S. military aid to Tajikistan in the coming four years while doubling the amount of aid offered by the State Department. As for the United States’ Air Base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, the U.S. hoped to continue using it after 2014, although it will not seek to establish permanent military bases in Central Asia.
Lastly, it has been reported that the U.S. and the U.K. have already held talks with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan since March 2012, noting that NATO would leave parts of its weaponry to these three states based on bilateral agreements after its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.
In addition, the “Steppe Eagle 2012” military exercise was held in the Almaty region between September 6-21, 2012 with armed forces from the United States, Great Britain, Kazakhstan and a small Tajiki special force. All the above-mentioned activities suggest that Russian-U.S. competition in Central Asia is intensifying and that Uzbekistan’s suspension of its CSTO membership is an important factor in this renewed competition.
IV. Conclusion
Looking back the twists and turns in the Uzbek-CSTO relations that are described above, the linkages between the two have evidently been the weathervane for the development of Uzbek-Russian relations and Uzbek-American relations. To some degree, Uzbekistan’s suspension of its CSTO membership is a strike on Putin’s endeavor to promote Eurasian integration. Although Uzbekistan decided not to allow the establishment of new military bases on its territory in order to dispel Russia’s anxiety since its departure from the CSTO, Uzbekistan reserves the rights and the maneuvering space to engage in close cooperation with other states and international organizations, including the United States and NATO. In order to guarantee its own leverage in Central Asia and make deployments correspondingly for the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan after 2014, the U.S. and Russia have both taken multiple measures aimed at improving their relations with Central Asian states. Uzbekistan’s suspension of its CSTO membership may further intensify U.S.Russian competition in the Central Asian region.
1 Roger McDermott, “CSTO Proposes Cooperation with NATO on Afghanistan,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, Vol.9, No.71, April 10, 2012.
2 Luca Anceschi, “Integrating Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Making: The Case of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,” Central Asian Survey, Vol.29, No.2, 2010, pp.155-156.
3 Zabikhulla S. Saipov, “Factors that Influenced Uzbekistan’s Decision to Pull out of the CSTO: The View from Tashkent,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol.9, No.136, 2012.
4 Umida Hashimova, “East-West Diplomacy of the Uzbek President,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol.8, No.34, February 17, 2011.
5 Roman Muzalevsky, “Twists and Turns of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 9, No.156, August 15, 2012.
Zeng Xianghong