The lack of a relatively stable analysis framework has been a critical reason underlying academia’s failure to have a historical and objective grasp on Russian-U.S. relations. To make a theoretical study instead of a review of current affairs over the Russian-U.S. relations, one must put the essential variables affecting the Russian-U.S. relations into a clear system for the academic exploration. By analyzing the recent changes of the four essential variables – military strategy, geopolitics, economics, and domestic politics – affecting the Russian-U.S. relations through a multi-perspective approach, the following article comes to the conclusion that the process of resetting in the Russian-U.S. relations will not be interrupted, and that in the next five years Russian-U.S. relations are projected to continue to heat up.

　　I Military Strategy: Bargaining and Seeking Compromise 

　　Current Russian-U.S. relations have inherited the contents of the Soviet-U.S. relations, despite the fact that more than 20 years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The Soviet-U.S. relationship is one between different social systems and ideologies, between the two superpowers in the world, and between two antagonist blocs headed by the two countries’ leaders. At a time when antagonism in a social system and ideology between the countries has been substantially weakened, the rivalry on military strategic balance remains the core of the Russian-U.S. relations. In the eyes of the United States, Russia is the only nation capable of completely dismantling the United States in mere minutes. Therefore, the focus of the U.S. policy toward Russia is to ensure that Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal will not pose a threat to U.S. national security, and to avoid the diversion and proliferation of the nuclear technology and material as well as the missile technology. However, Russia holds that maintaining strategic balance with the United States is a critical means to sustaining its major power status, and its policy objective toward the United States largely focuses on keeping the existing strategic balance in its current form.

　　Along with changes in the international strategic situation, the cooperation between Russia and the United States in the field of nuclear arms control and nuclear security has made considerable headway. In terms of nuclear arms control, Medvedev and Obama signed the New START treaty in 2010, which was deemed the most important achievement since the resetting of Russian-U.S. relations. The treaty established a new Russian-U.S. relationship in nuclear strategy, sustained the mutual nuclear strategic balance, all while cutting the nuclear arsenal together, which was acclaimed to be able to assure the strategic stability and predictability before 2020. It is sure that Moscow and Washington will honor this treaty in spite of any other developments in Russian-U.S. relations. The two countries are unlikely to engage in a new arms race because they are facing budget deficits and other economic and security problems that are not directly connected with the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two countries. In the field of nuclear security, the two sides have not only completed the “lowering risk project” and strengthened cooperation in the regulation of nuclear material and anti-proliferation. They have also officially launched the “civilian nuclear agreement,” which allows the exchange of technologies, equipment, and other materials between the two countries, thus making it possible for the two countries to obtain new business opportunities in nuclear technologies.

　　In terms of Russian-U.S. military strategy, the most outstanding conflict lies in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) issue. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2011, Russia and NATO reached an agreement on conducting cooperation in establishing the missile defense system for Europe. From Russia’s perspective, it should be based on an equal footing to formulate the conception and structure of the missile defense system for Europe, and it must take corresponding measures to strengthen the trust and transparence in this field on the two sides. In other words, Russia intends to join the management of the system, and it also wants the United States to make a legal commitment that the system will never target Russia. The two requirements were not accepted at the Summit, and Russia became concerned that the missile defense system in Europe would be deployed by the United States and would be strong enough someday to intercept Russian missiles, thus undermining Russia’s nuclear deterrence. Therefore, President Medvedev announced on November 23, 2011 that if Russia could not reach a deal on the ABM issue with the United States, it would take multiple countermeasures.

　　It is worth noting that even though Russia is literally fierce in terms of the ABM issue, its fundamental intention is not to launch an arms race with the United States in this field, nor does it intend to confront the United States. Rather, it seeks to pressure the United States to change its position and maintain a strategic balance between them. Therefore, even when he delivered his hard-line address, Medvedev kept emphasizing that Russia is still inclined to continue talks with the United States and NATO and reach compromise on the most difficult part in its relations with the West.

　　Upon the cognizance, Russia on one hand persists in the “unsymmetrical balance” principle by stepping up its own nuclear force, especially elevating its missile penetration capability. On the other hand, it accelerates the pace of bargaining on the ABM issue with the United States, aiming to reach compromise. On February 27, 2012, Putin published his campaign platform on foreign policy, stating, “The inseparable link between missile defense and strategic offensive weapons is reflected in the New START treaty signed in 2010. The treaty has come into effect and is working fairly well. It is a major foreign policy achievement. We are ready to consider various options for our joint agenda with the Americans in the field of arms control in the coming period.” He recalled a meeting with President Bush in Kennebunkport in 2007: “I proposed a solution to the missile defense problem, which, if adopted, would have changed the customary character of Russian-American relations and opened up a positive path forward. Moreover, if we had managed to achieve a breakthrough on missile defense, this would have opened the floodgates for building a qualitatively new model of cooperation, similar to an alliance, in many other sensitive areas.” He further stated, “In recent years the Russian leadership has come forward with other proposals to resolve the dispute over missile defense. These proposals still stand. I am loath to dismiss the possibility of reaching a compromise on missile defense. One would not like to see the deployment of the American system on a scale that would demand the implementation of our declared countermeasures.”

　　At present, Russia and the United States are stepping up efforts to hold intensive consultations on the ABM issue between diplomatic and military circles from the two countries. They have not only touched on military policies, but further on the technical parameters of their relations. It is worth noting that during the Seoul Nuclear Summit in March 2012, Obama asked Medvedev to convey a message to Putin that when he is re-elected, he will adopt a more flexible policy on the missile defense system. This signals that the Obama administration wants to make a compromise with Putin. On April 26, Medvedev remarked, “The ABM issue should be addressed, but we still have 5-7 years to make a final decision. I hope we can make progress in the forthcoming years. If it fails, we will deploy missiles.”

　　All the developments suggest that Russia and the United States are stepping up consultations on the ABM issue. But they still have enough time to bargain on this issue as they are not eager to make a final decision at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May this year. Viewed from the international strategic security situation and the development trend of the Russian-

　　U.S. relations, the possibility can never be ruled out that both sides reach a compromise on the ABM issue and engage in some kind of cooperation.

　　II Geopolitics: A Temporarily Eased Contradiction 

　　In a long period of time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States regarded Russia as its most important geopolitical adversary. Keeping vigilance against Russia’s attempts at empire and guarding against its re-emergence have become the critical points of its policy toward Russia. The global financial crisis has not only impacted the current international order and regional structure, but also brought new changes in the geopolitical relations between Russia and the United States. Inflicted with severe impacts in the financial crisis, the downfall of the Russian economy in 2009 was the greatest among the G8 and the BRICS, fully exposing the unsustainability of its economic development structure and the fragility of its national strength. Parallel with this was the relative decline in the United States’ comprehensive strength and the rise of China to become the second largest economy in the world. The change in the balance of power has given rise to a reshuffle of the big power strategies and their relations. It was the United States’ judgment after reevaluation that the geopolitical challenge to the United States by Russia has been greatly reduced. The United States and Russia should alter the traditional modality of their interstate relations and seek for a new framework in their relations. In May 2010, the Obama administration passed the new National Security Strategy which declared, “We seek to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests. The United States has an interest in a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia that respects international norms. As the two nations possessing the majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, we are working together to advance nonproliferation, both by reducing our nuclear arsenals and by cooperating to ensure that other countries meet their international commitments to reducing the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. We will seek greater partnership with Russia in confronting violent extremism, especially in Afghanistan.”

　　The crisis has not only impacted the current international order and regional structure,but also brought new changes in the Russian-U.S. geopolitical relations. 

　　Parallel with the change in U.S. recognition of Russia is a decline in the United States’ capability to push forward the NATO to further expand, thus temporarily bringing a “full stop” to the NATO eastward expansion that has long perplexed Russia. Russia seized this opportunity, trying to restore its influence in the post-Soviet space. On October 5, 2011, Putin published an article entitled “New Integration Project for Eurasia - A Future That Is Being Born Today” that systemically elaborated on the concept of building the “Eurasia Union” (EuU). From Putin’s perspective, the Eurasia Union is aimed at realizing integration on the basis of new values and new political and economic realities. The future EuU will be a “supra-national body” that is capable of becoming a pole in the multi-polar world and playing a role in connecting Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. In Putin’s vision, the construction of the EuU will include four phases. The first phase is the customs union. Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the customs union treaty in 2007, declaring that they would unify customs by July 2011. At present, controls over the movement of goods have been removed on the internal borders of the three countries, and a supranational body—customs union commission— has been established. The second phase is to establish Eurasia unified economic spaces. From 2012 onward, the three countries will implement the free circulation of goods, trade, investment, and labor among the three countries. In 2013 and 2014, the three countries will achieve a unified economic space, form supranational coordinating bodies, establish a unified central bank and a common energy market, and attract more CIS countries to join. The third phase is the Eurasian Economic Union. It is expected to be established in 2015, when currencies and markets will be unified, the unified policies will be implemented on technical standards, agricultural subsidies, transportation and other fields. Internal border controls will be abolished, and the uniform visa and immigration policies similar to the “Schengen area” will be carried out. The fourth phase is a Eurasian Union. It will be a supranational union extending from the economy to politics, security, education, and culture. Even though some people in the United States are convinced that the outcome of Putin’s efforts to create a Union of Eurasia will lead to the country’s reemergence as a regional empire and a new confrontation with the United States, the reality is that the U.S. lacks the will and resources to prioritize confrontation with Russia.

　　At a time when Russian-U.S. geo-political conflicts were temporary relieved, the two countries have made considerable progress in a number of important international political issues, especially in the cooperation of the “northern distribution network.” The “northern distribution network” is a transportation route via Russia and Central Asian countries to provide necessities for coalition forces and deliver reconstruction supplies for Afghanistan.

　　Alongside the U.S. accelerating its pace of troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and the complication of the Pakistani situation, the strategic significance of the “northern distribution network” is getting more and more prominent. At a Conference on the Afghanistan issue held in New York in September 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton officially put forward the “New Silk Road Initiative.” calling it “a web of economic and transit connections that will bind together a region too long torn apart by conflict and division.” The United States tried to invest in infrastructure and remove artificial barriers in Afghanistan with the aim of rebuilding Afghanistan into a hub connecting the resources and markets in Central and South Asia, thus promoting regional economic integration. Regardless of some Russian people’s concerns that the United States’ “New Silk Road Initiative” would undermine Russia’s traditional influence in Central Asia, the Russian government tacitly approved the initiative.

　　Moreover, Russia and the United States have recently stepped up efforts to discuss setting up a transfer station in Ulyanovsk for NATO to send back materials from Afghanistan. Putin commented: “NATO needs to set up a transit station in Ulyanovsk, as the stability of Afghanistan conforms to Russia’s national interests.” Russia also anticipates that the route will play a big role in logistical communication between Russia and the Central and South Asia, and strengthen its geopolitical influence in the region after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan.

　　It can be seen that with the change in the international strategic situation, geopolitical competition between Russia and the United States has calmed for the moment, while cooperation on the issue of Afghanistan has provided opportunities to further enhance Russian-U.S. relations.

　　III Economic and Trade Ties: Seeking Breakthroughs 

　　Fragile economic and trade ties have long restrained the development of the Russian-U.S. relations. In 2008, bilateral trade volume stood at merely $ 27.1 billon. In 2010, even though the Russian-U.S. trade volume had roughly returned to pre-crisis levels, the figure stood at only $25.3 billion. The United States is the seventh largest trading partner of Russia, after Belarus and Turkey on the list of Russia’s trade partners, while Russia is not even the United States’ 25th largest trade partner, much lower than other members of the G8.

　　In the field of investment cooperation, in 2011, PepsiCo invested $3.8 billion to acquire 66% of Wimm-Bill-Dann, Russia’s leading food and beverage company. Other big U.S. companies like Microsoft, IBM, Intel, and Google had also shown great interest in the Skolkova Innovation Initiative — a Russian Silicon Valley in the suburbs of Moscow. But by January 1, 2011, total U.S. investment in Russia was only $5.38 billion, accounting only for 4% of the foreign investment in Russia.

　　Weak economic and trade relations have tremendously affected Russian-U.S. relations. Putin was well aware that “the major problem in the Russian-U.S. relations is the lack of a stable economic foundation for bilateral political dialogue and cooperation. The bilateral trade volume and mutual investment scale do not fit in with the economic potentials of the two countries, and therefore the safety net preventing the bilateral relations from impacting of the fluctuation of the bilateral relations has not yet been established.”

　　The central task for Putin after he resumes his presidency will be to reinvigorate a Russian economy that remains heavily dependent on the export of gas and oil, and modernize Russian industry. For this purpose, he needs to persuade more Western companies to do business in Russia. Analysts believe that “since both Obama and Putin have an interest in seeing economic ties grow, the best chance for the United States and Russia to improve their relations may lie in business and trade.”

　　Recently, some obstacles that have long hindered Russian-U.S. economic cooperation are being gradually removed, suggesting that the Russian-U.S. economic cooperation may soon usher in a new period of rapid growth. On November 10, 2011, the WTO adopted the final text of the treaty on Russia’s accession to the WTO, wrapping up Russia’s 18-year-long WTO negotiation process. “Accession to the WTO is the most important move for Russia to integrate into the world economy, and it will promote the integration of the Russian economy into the global economy. Despite many concerns in Russia over the risks of Russia’s accession to the WTO, Putin is convinced that “entry into the WTO will strategically provide a strong impetus for the innovative development of the Russian economy. The opening-up of the economy and the intensification of competition will be in favor of Russian citizens, and spur our producers to improve their business performance. In the meanwhile, joining the WTO provides the possibility of safeguarding our national interest in the legal track.” Russia’s joining the WTO will also bring a stable trading environment to its trading partners and enterprises, and is conducive to the promotion of the standardization of trade rules. After joining the WTO, Russia’s overall tariff level will fall from its current 10 percent to 7.8 percent. Specifically, the level of tariffs on agricultural products will drop from 13.2% to 10.8%, and the level of tariffs on industrial products will drop from 9.5% to 7.3%.

　　“Since both Obama and Putin have an interest in seeing economic ties grow, the best chance for the United States and Russia to improve their relations may lie in business and trade.” 

　　Since the resetting of Russian-U.S. relations, the United States has taken a constructive position towards Russia’s accession to the WTO, while Russia’s accession to the WTO will also provide new opportunities for further development of Russian-U.S. economic cooperation. Following his support of Russia’s accession to the WTO, President Obama sees the enhancement of the economic and trade ties as a breakthrough in improving Russian-U.S. relations. In Obama’s view, the existence of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment will hinder United States businesses from fully sharing the benefits of Russia’s accession to the WTO, so he has intensified efforts to persuade Congress to repeal the amendment. The two political parties are still split on the issue in Congress, but it is imperative for the United States to repeal the bill to honor the WTO rules in the case of Russia’s accession to the WTO. As a result, the shackles that have long hindered the Russian-U.S. economic and trade ties are loosening.

　　On August 30, 2011, Russia’s state-owned oil company Rosneft and U.S. oil giant ExxonMobil signed an agreement to jointly undertake a US$3.2 billion oil and gas exploration program in the Black Sea and the Kara Sea on the Arctic Ocean. On April 16, 2012, Rosneft president Khudainatov and Exxon-Mobil CEO Tillerson signed the second phase of the strategic alliance agreement in the presence of Russian Prime Minister Putin, under which Rosneft will receive a 30% stake in three projects in Texas, the Gulf of Mexico and Canada.

　　Rosneft is as an important tool for the Russian government to carry out the energy strategy and energy diplomacy, and strategic cooperation with Exxon-Mobil Corporation is not an impromptu move but rather one with long-term strategic objectives.

　　First, to initiate the Arctic continental shelf development. Putin attaches great importance to the development of the Arctic. Russia’s “Mineral Resources Law” provides that only state-owned companies have the right to develop the Russian continental shelf, yet Rosneft and Gazprom are unable to develop alone. In 2011, Russia had extended invitations to the European and the U.S. energy companies, and reached a deal with BP on joint Arctic oil exploration, but the deal was aborted due to stock ownership disputes. Ultimately, Exxon-Mobil became the first foreign energy company to enter the Russian Arctic continental shelf due to its advantages in capital, technology and access to the global upstream market.

　　Second, it seeks to accelerate the modernization of the energy sector. To explore the Kara sea, the two companies will create an Arctic Research and Design Center for Offshore Developments in St. Petersburg, which will be staffed by Rosneft and ExxonMobil employees. The St. Petersburg center will develop new technologies to support the joint Arctic project, including drilling, production and ice-class drilling platforms. Russia’s first floating nuclear power plant will also be built this year to aid in the development of this project. With the advanced technology and expertise of the United States, Russia will acquire a full set of technologies for the Arctic continental shelf oil and gas development, and therefore enhance the modernization level of its oil and gas industries.

　　Third, it will provide funds for the innovative economy. Putin’s innovative economy initiative demands trillions of dollars in investment, which is far beyond the capability of Russia’s current financial situation. The Russian government plans to exploit 80 million tons of oil and 210 billion cubic meters of natural gas every year from the Arctic continental shelf, totaling a value of over $100 billion by 2030, all so that it can ensure the implementation of the innovative economy initiative.

　　Fourth, it will help encourage foreign investment. Thus far, Russia has only attracted $493.5 billion foreign direct investment, 65% of which has come from international offshore centers – mostly the circuitous investment from the domestic capital. In recent years, due to corruption, bad performance in protecting private property rights and other reasons, the Russian investment environment has deteriorated remarkably, discouraging foreign investment and inviting criticisms from domestic opposition parties. Putin predicts that the project will attract $500 billion in the next 30 years for the oil and gas sector, and bring $300 direct investment to the relevant sectors. The injection of huge amounts of U.S. funds before Putin’s new presidential term will help boost the economy and Putin’s prestige.

　　It is fair to say that the Russian-U.S. energy cooperation is an important aspect of their bilateral economic interest, promoting the overall level of Russian-U.S. economic cooperation, and laying a solid foundation for the improvement of the bilateral relations.

　　IV Domestic Politics: Move towards Positive Changes 

　　Russian-U.S. relations have long been influenced tremendously by domestic political factors in the two countries. In the long period of time since the end of the Cold War, Russia is no longer a global rival of Washington. But to many people in Russia and the United States, confrontation is still the natural state in their bilateral relations. A combination of psychology, habits, and personal reasons all have exerted impacts on this confrontation. However, in the great international transformation triggered by the global financial crisis and under the atmosphere of the resetting of the Russian-U.S. relations, domestic political factors affecting Russian-U.S. relations are undergoing a slow but important change.

　　First of all, mutual cognizance between Russia and the U.S. is experiencing an important change from one of adversaries to one of partnership. In 2009, in the article entitled “An Uncertain Reset: Can the United States and Russia Find a Common Language?”, Director of the Nixon Center Dimitri K. Simes said, “Pursuing a partnership with Moscow is difficult and frustrating, but neglecting Russia could severely compromise the pursuit of vital U.S. national interests tomorrow and in the years to come. The United States must extricate the inertia thinking that Russia is impossible to be a strategic partner. The United States needs to think more strategically about what is required to turn Russia into a responsible stakeholder in international security.”

　　In March 2011, Russia’s strategic think tank, the Valdai Discussion Club, published its research report entitled “The U.S.-Russia Relations after the ‘Reset’: Building a New Agenda,” which claimed that “U.S.—Russian relations have markedly improved over the past two years. The ‘reset’ of relations proposed by the Barack Obama administration has been a success. The threat of a retreat to a systemic confrontation has almost disappeared. Many of the conflicts between the two countries have been either resolved or, for the most part, reduced to a simmer. Both Russia and the United States have displayed pragmatism by lowering the importance of persisting conflicts in favor of the benefits of cooperation. For the first time in the post-Soviet era, the U.S. has partially revised its position on Russia-related issues and its interests with regard to Russia for the sake of gaining Moscow’s support in matters of interest to Washington. Unlike in previous rounds, the current improvement of the U.S.-Russian relations rests on a more solid foundation – namely, the parties have a clear and pragmatic understanding of their interests and the importance of constructive mutual relations for their implementation.”

　　Moreover, strategic circles in Russia and the U.S. also enhance their interaction, striving to seek new breakthroughs in bilateral relations. Former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and other senior officials established the “Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative” team. In February 2012, the final report of the team was published at the 48th Munich Conference on Security Policy. The report proposes “to transform and demilitarize strategic relations between the United States, NATO and Russia, and build an inclusive, effective Euro-Atlantic Security Community.”

　　Second, the lobbying groups in support of increasing Russian-U.S. relations are growing. This year is a general election year in the United States. In the debate on foreign policy between the Democratic and Republican parties, China has taken over Russia and become the focus of debate. The Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney accused Barack Obama of “being weak” in the “Microphone gate,” saying that Russia was the top enemy of the United States on the geopolitical front. But in subsequent debates it showed that his view was not the mainstream. More importantly, although the total amount of U.S. exports to Russia is still very small, some major U.S. corporations, including Boeing, Caterpillar, General Motors Corporation and Ford Motor Company, have found markets with vast profit margins. These U.S. corporations are increasingly active in defending the importance of the sound U.S.-Russian economic ties, which offers necessary basis in preventing unavoidable divergences in improving relations.

　　Third, the Russian-U.S. bilateral Presidential Commission (Obama-Medvedev Commission) provides the appropriate mechanism for the improvement of bilateral relations, and has broken the bureaucratic inertia of the two countries to some extent. As an important outcome of the resetting of the Russian-U.S. relations, Russia and the United States Presidential Commission was formally established in 2009, and its mandate is “to continue to broaden and deepen cooperation between our governments and peoples to advance common interests.” Over the past year, the Commission’s structure has grown, with working groups on innovation and rule of law added to the 20 working groups that are producing practice results. Over sixty U.S. and Russian government agencies now support the work of the Commission and have facilitated over 400 meetings, exchanges, exercises, and other joint projects since the Commission’s start. The Commission has also served as a venue for connecting United States and Russian citizens across a wide range of professions – from high technology entrepreneurs to business students, doctors to nuclear scientists, counter-narcotics experts to green technology innovators.

　　Fourth, Putin’s return as Russia’s leader is not adverse to the Russian-U.S. relations as forecast by mass media. With Putin’s return to the Kremlin, most people believe Russian-U.S. relations will be damaged. But it should be noted that even though Putin is verbally fierce toward the United States, he is by no means in favor of the anti-American sentiment. In the wake of 9/11, Putin firmly supported Washington; in 2009 and 2010, Russia cast vote in favor of stepping up sanctions on Iran in the UN Security Council. Director of the RAND Center for Russia and Eurasia Andrew S. Weiss said, “There are plenty of important issues on the agenda — nuclear nonproliferation, terrorism, the dangerous situation in Pakistan and the wobbly global economy — on which U.S. and Russian interests more or less converge. An experienced leader such as Putin, who prides himself on being cold-hearted and calculating, surely figured that out long ago.” In the presidential election in Russia, Putin was aware that Russian voters were expecting anti-American rhetoric, but he was more like a strategist on national interests rather than a populist. Putin was very modest towards the United States in his campaign platform, expecting substantive breakthroughs in relations with the United States and hoping to bring Russian-U.S. relations to a mode of cooperation between allies. We may say that Putin is well aware of the importance of establishing a real partnership with the United States and NATO for the modernization of Russia. He not only endorses this in principle but also looks for a real possibility of promoting the development of this relationship, as long as it is not at the expense of Russian interests.

　　V Conclusion 

　　Through the analysis of the above four variables, we can see that Russian-U.S. relations are undergoing significant changes. In the area of military strategy, the two countries have made visible progress in terms of nuclear disarmament and anti-proliferation, and they are bargaining on the ABM issue with the aim of seeking compromises. In the area of the geopolitics, as the eastward expansion of NATO that made Russia feel pressure ceases its pace temporarily, the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the United States in the post-Soviet period has come to a halt for the moment. Russia grasped an unprecedented opportunity to consolidate its influence over the former Soviet states, which was condoned by the United States. In the economic and trade spheres, the impending entry of Russia into the WTO and the forthcoming repeal of the “Jackson-Vanik Amendment” will free the Russian-U.S. economic cooperation from its old obstacles. Putin looks upon the United States as an indispensable source of capital and technology for the modernization of the Russian economy, and he is attempting to accelerate Russian-U.S. economic cooperation with the energy cooperation as the breakthrough point. In the area of domestic politics, the mutual strategic cognizance between Russia and the United States is experiencing a historical change from the adversary to partnership and the lobbying groups in support of the development of the Russian-U.S. relations are taking shape. The setup and running of the Presidential Commission have to some extent broken the inertia of the bureaucracy, which offered new platforms for bilateral cooperation. More importantly, Putin is a realist. He anticipates and will push the Russian-U.S. relations ahead to achieve a qualitative breakthrough. It can be projected that in the coming five years, the resetting process will continue and bilateral ties are expected to maintain the tendency of heating up.

　　Feng Yujun is Senior Research Fellow at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.