The deal that would not die

As long as it divides the Tehran regime, western diplomats are reluctant to give up entirely on a uranium deal

Julian Borger 

·         http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2009/nov/15/iran-nuclear-obama

The patient has shown no sign of life for weeks, but no one is ready yet to declare it dead. The International Atomic Energy Agency gave Iran until the end of October to confirm a deal it had agreed in principle at the beginning of that month - to export most of its Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) in return for French-made fuel rods for a medical research reactor in Tehran about a year later.

Iran's response was that it would hand over the LEU only when the fuel was delivered, ensuring its stockpile was at no point significantly reduced. As that was the whole point of bargain from the point of view of the other parties to the agreement - Russia, France, the US and IAEA - the negotiations have been stuck.

A week ago, Recep Tayyip Erdogan met Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Istanbul in the sidelines of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference summit and offered him a compromise, apparently with US blessing: Iran could send its LEU to Turkey for safekeeping while it awaited delivery of its fuel rods. The idea was that the prized uranium would in the hands of a friendly country that Iran could trust. Iran declined.

After a meeting with Dmitry Medvedev, Barack Obama said time was "running out" for the deal. Strictly speaking, the time allotted by the IAEA ran out weeks ago, but all parties involved in the deal are reluctant to abandon the only really promising development in Iranian nuclear talks in more than four years.

The Americans and Europeans believe the uranium export proposal has caused new and interesting splits in the Iranian body politic that could ultimately change a line. A European diplomat I spoke to last week saw Ahmadinejad as the most enthusiastic on the uranium deal, with Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, united in scepticism with conservative opposition figures like Ali Larijani, and reformists like Mirhossein Mousavi. Tearing the deal up and threatening sweeping sanctions would simply reunify the Iranian camp, the argument goes.

The other reason to keep the ball in play is the depressing nature of the alternatives. Medvedev is on board with more sanctions in principle, but in practice there would probably long and painful disputes over how far those sanctions should go among the E3+3 group (Britain, France, Germany, the US, Russia and China) handling negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme. Washington's desire to slap sanctions on Iran's oil and gas sector could split the group, with Russia and China refusing to go the whole way. Without international consensus behind them, the measures risk falling short of the severity needed to force Iranian compliance but could nevertheless trigger an oil-spiking crisis in the Gulf anyway. The worst of both worlds.

And yet, time has to be called at some point, because without a deadline there is no incentive for Iran to agree to anything, and because Israel is believed to have its own timetable for military action if no progress is made. Unless something remarkable turns up, that deadline will fall at the end of December. At this rate, 2010 looks like it could be an even bleaker year in the Middle East than 2009.