The year 2008 was an eventful year for Russia, Central and East Europe and Central Asia. It witnessed Russian presidential election, Kosovo's uniletural declaration of independence, the five-day military conflict between Russia and Georgia, evaluation.

I. Medvedev-Putin System: the unique
Russian top power mechanism

        The Russian presidential election in 2008 drew great attention from the whole world. The major concerns before the election could be summarized as this: will Putin to do after he stepped down?

        Actually to run for a third term. and legally.

        Regarding the second riddle, namely who will be succeessor of Putin? Putin declared at the outset of the year 2008 that he would nominate Dimitry Medvedev for the presidential candidate. To some observers, this decision is not quite contrary to all expectations. Being an important adviser for Putin power team, he enjoyed the trust of the later. To other observers, however, the nomination by Putin is beyond all expectations，because Putin laid many dazzling smokescreens and no body really figured out in his mind before his most favorite successor seemed clear to the public.

        As to the third riddle, being the presidential candidate, Dimitry Medvedev proclaimed that he will appoint Vladimir Putin to be Russian Prime Minister if he win the presidential election. As such, their answer to the third political riddle was clear. He Immediately after he became President, Medvedev immediately appointed Putin the Prime Minister of Russia, thus leading Russian politics into an era of Medvedev-Putin Combination.

        The Medvedev-Putin System (namely so called The medvedev-Putin Combination) is characterized by three outstanding features. first, "the Putin Team" serves the underlying political basis for this combination. The common political objective and strategy unites the two most powerful men in Russian political arena. Medvedev reiterated and emphasized over and over again the necessity and continuity of the implementation of "the Putin Program". Second, "the Putin Team" serves as the political framework of the Medvedev-Putin Combination. This combination, under Russia's existing constitutional and legal framework, helps to maximally advance the smooth and effective operation of Russia's supreme power mechanisms and put Russia's supreme power under the control of "the Putin Team". This is really a relatively successful political operation in today's Russia, whose political party system is still at the nascent stage. Third, the political confidence in each other serves as a firm political cohesion in the Medvedev-Putin System. This confidence is also conducive to the collaboration and cooperation between the two most powerful men in Russian politics.

        Judging from the actual operation of the Medvedev-Putin System, it is safe to conclude that the co-head Russian political mechanism has been working fine as yet, and the two men have been able to cooperate perfectly well. The Russian-Georgian Conflict in 2008 was a test ground for the the Medvedev-Putin System, and the two men acted in almost perfect political and diplomatic unison in dealing with the military conflict. However, the disharmony reflected in Medvedev's recent criticism of the government work in its dealing with the exacerbation of the international financial crisis draws the attention of the observers of international issues. The top priority in Russian politics in 2009 will be how to overcome the worsening economic crisis. This issue poses a real political test to the Medvedev-Putin partnership. The implication of this political test are twofold. Firstly, it is a real test to the ability of the Medvedev-Putin partnership in solving tough economic problems and in handling the domestic and international politics. Besides, it is also a test to whether the two men are able to work hand in hand to face the crisis and take a due responsibility. After all, the most difficult time is indeed a time to test the loyalty and effectiveness of the political combination.

        In 2008 Dmitry Medvedev made another significant political action, initiating to extend the presidency from four years to six years for a term. Upon learning the news, many Russian observers maintained that Russia might hold presidential election in 2009, three years ahead of the schedule, so as to provide the constitutional basis for Putin to return to presidency. Responding to this, Putin stated definitely that there will be no general election until Medvedev finishes his term. However, nothing is impossible in a country like Russia. Confronted with the deteriorating economic crisis, whether the Russians would expect Putin, a powerful leader, to return to presidency ahead of schedule is still in suspense. Certain implications of the political puzzles designed by Putin are yet to be figured out.

II. A hot topic in global politics:
the Russian-Georgian Conflict in 2008

        The Russian-Georgian military conflict broke out in the heart of the Eurasian continent, yet ly speaking, it has far-reaching global strategical implications.

        First, the underlying cause of this military conflict lies in its complicated historical background. The disintegration of the Soviet Union marked the end of a former superpower. However, the newly independent nations are also troubled by the danger of internal split. It is true with Russia. So it is with Georgia. The internal struggle within Georgia is a course of the power struggle between the pro-Russia elements and anti-Russian forces. Georgia's pursuit of independence is actually a reflection of its tendency to pursue independence from Russian influence, while South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two autonomous republics in Georgia, have worked hard to separate themselves from Georgia and return to Russia. Georgia's case tells us that its independence from the Soviet Union cannot save itself from internal split.

        Besides, as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Russia and Georgia began to define their national interests in different terms, which engendered contradictions and conflicts of interests between the two neighbors. Bilateral relations between Russia and Georgia suffered from the definition of their interests. The Russian factor, determined by the geopolitical reality, has played a significant role in Georgia's attempt to deal with its internal troubles.

        Out of geopolitical and geo-economic concerns, the United States and the EU Transcaucasian region in the wake of the collapse of the in the Transcaucasian region forms the international background for the Russia-Georgia conflict and further intensifies the crisis in the region.

        Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia on 17 Febrary 2008. which quickly won the recognition of the United States and some major European countries. This is the so-called "Kosovo Model". This Model poses a serious challenge to the present international norms and consensus. From this perspective, the Russian-Georgian conflict and recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia can be viewed as a reflection of Russian attempt to implement the "Kosovo Model" in its own favor. Only at this time has the United States come to realized that its support of Kosovo independence finally backfired.

        The Russian-Georgian Conflict induced several important questions. First, to promote moral principles or to pursue interests, this is a question. Russia employed the "Kosovo Model", which it condemned repetitively, to handle the issue of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Therefore, how to uphold and maintain the existing international norms and principles in the future will be a rigorous test. Second, Russia manipulated Georgia's miscalculation and quickly took military and diplomatic advantage to control the situation. Third, Russia, for the first time in the Post-Cold War era, used forces to solve the dispute with its neighbors, which also showed Russia's will and determination in safeguarding its vital interests in its neighboring regions and its capability of power projection. Fourth, this conflict also showed the relative limits of the United States and NATO in their projection of power in the Transcaucasian region. Fifth, Russia's bold actions in dealing with Georgia brought both positive and negative impact on the other members of the CIS. The positive one for Russia is that the members of the CIS may give a second thought before they decide to distance themselves from Russia, while the negtive one for Russia is that its using force in dealing with Georgia aroused the former Soviet republics' suspicions and fears, and thus undermine Russia's soft power.

III. The Abrupt outbreak of
the International Financial Crisis

        The international financial crisis originated from the United States has engendered a shocking wave on Russia, Central and East European and Central Asian countries. This shocking wave is reflected in four major aspects. First, it has trigged a widespread financial crisis in the region. Second, the financial crisis has turned into a prevalent economic crisis. Third, the economic development in the region has slowed down. Last but not the least, it has varying impact on countries in the region. Those that are more closely involved in the international financial system are more adversely affected, while those that are not closely involved are less affected.

        At the preliminary stage of the financial crisis, Russia's top leaders have noticed the negative impact of American sub-prime mortgage crisis. However, they apparently underestimated its adverse effects. They had anticipated that the sub-prime crisis would have a serious consequence on the United States, but they concluded that Russia would be spared. They maintained that Russia should take this opportunity to challenge the US hegemonic position in the international financial system, and seek to change the current international financial system and economic order in Russia's favor.

        However, the result is beyond the Russain leaders expectations. Russia cannot free itself from the crisis. The Russian government had to take a series of measures to stabilize the financial market and reinvigorate the national economy. One of the most important measures is the implementation of an economic bailout package of $200 billion.Besides, The Russian federal government also initiated a series of measures to stabilize the financial and economic situation.

        The underestimate of the seriousness of the international financial crisis is just one of the blunders of the Medvedev-Putin System. Their failure to anticipate the plummeting of the international oil prices is another one. At the beginning of 2008, the international oil price was $70 a barrel, on which base the Russian federal government formulated its balance of payments. However, the oil price in the international crude oil market dropped from $147 a barrel in July to $40 minus at the end of the year. The crash of the oil price hit hard the Russian economy. The economic pressure on Russia's major oil giants was more than they could bear. In this case, the federal government decided to reduce the oil export duty from $485.8 per ton to $372 per ton. This policy came into effect on October 1, 2008.

        Besides, due to lack of adequate monitor from the financial department in the past several years, the foreign debts owned by Russia's major oil corporations accumulate to $295 billion, in addition to $39 billion of interests. Such an enormous amount of debts could well drive Russian banks into bankruptcy and engender formidable debt crisis. Russia, fortunately, possesses a large foreign reserve over $500 billion, which might help to balance its foreign debts. The bad news is when the debts of Russia's major banks and large corporations are of largely the equal size to its foreign currency reserve, serious economic problems might arise.

        In spite of the difficulties which are now troubling Russia's economy, it is not fair to conclude that Russia's economy has a gloomy prospect. After all, the Russian economy today is much stronger than it was in the 1998 financial crisis. However, Russia is still confronted with a series of economic problems in 2009. If this economic crisis is not adequately handled, the social unrest might occur, which, in turn, might lead to political unrest. In this sense, how to overcome the present economic crisis has become the top priority for the Russian leaders. It is also a grave challenge posed to this combination.

IV. The Evolution of Power Distribution
in the Eurasian region

        An adequate analysis of the distribution of power in the domains of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe requires us to take into account the historical factor. The drastic change in the former socialist countries and the disintegration of the Soviet Union not only brought about dramatic changes to the geopolitical balance of power in the region but also brought about fundamental changes to the international political order,the East Bloc, headed by the Soviet Union, collapsed; on the other hand, the West Camp, led by the United States, not only survived, but also continued to expand its border. Thus, an asymmetric geopolitical pattern in the Eurasian continent arose.

        At the outset of its independence, Russia took drastic measures, the so-called shock therapy, to quickly and directly copy and transplant the western economic and political systems. If the collapse of the Soviet Union was considered to be a catastrophe for the maintenance of Russia's geopolitical leverage, then the blind economic replication and political transplantation turned out to be a disaster in Russia's transition to a market economy. Russia's strategic objective is quite different from that of the West. Russia wished to reinvigorate its national strength and achieve another rise, with the final purpose of balancing the United States and continuing to control of the world with the latter. In contrast, the United States and its European allies sought to change Russia, squeeze its strategic space to the maximum degree, and finally contain Russia's resurgence.

        Driven by these strategic goals, the United States took three coherent steps. First, by supporting dual enlargement (i.e. NATO enlargement and EU enlargement), the United States integrated the former central and eastern European socialist countries. Second, at the outset of the new century, the United States and its European allies began to take steps to expand its influence within the CIS. If this succeeds, the United States will take the final strategic objective, to disintegrate the Federation of Russian Republics!

        In order to realize its resurgence, Russia needs using its every possible means to create a relatively stable, peaceful and friendly international environment, especially around its neighborhood. But the reality facing Russia is that the United States and its allies deprive Russia of time and space to do so. Besides, although Russia's is wont to rise against the obstacles, to play energy card, to wield military force and other hard power resources to achieve its strategic objective, this actually reflects Russia's weaknesses, i.e. a lack of effective measures to counter the de-Russianization. This is really a formidable task the Medvedev-Putin System has to tackle.

        In essence, there is nothing wrong with Russia's dream of pursuing its national rejuvenation. The question is that how will Russia to achieve it? The Russian political figures need to take concrete actions to prevent the expansion of ultranationalist tendencies, which might bring about a sense of pressure and fear among its CIS neighbors. There is another important factor which merits discussion. In the process of the pursuit of national rejuvenation, Russia relies more and more on its resources. Such a developmental strategy is problematic and unpredictable, and sometimes dangerous. The economic crisis in Russia in 2008 demonstrates that Russia's economic growth mode and its economic strategic choices are problematic. Russia needs to find a new developmental model which is not only in line with the regular rules of social development, but also in line with Russia's own national realities, as an effective governing model is also a direct reflection of the soft power, which is often wielded by major powers to influence their neighbors.

        Enlargement of NATO and the EU is actually consistent with Central and East European countries' desire to integrate into the West. In other words, it is a reciprocal course. What Russia to do when it facing this situation? It has no alternatives but to care for the concerns of these countries. On the one hand, Russia needs to respect their interests and desires so as to win their trust, demonstrating to them that they can acquire a sense of security through a close cooperation with Russia. On the other hand, Russia should firstly try to establish a stable, rational and effective governing model within its own boundary. Such a model will makes it possible for its neighboring to follow suit.

        With the increase of Russia's attractiveness and the expansion of its exemplary influence, Russia will acquire more centripetal force, which will help to contain the de-Russianizing tendency and drive America's attempt to contain Russia into bankruptcy. This is the essence of the issue. Now Russia has no time to waste. Those countries that have accessed the EU have gradually achieved their interest goals in terms of national security and national development, and the de-Russianizing tendency has been hardened. Moreover, the United States is deploying the anti-ballistic missiles in Poland and Czech Republic, which poses a serious strategic challenge to Russia's national security. It is more and more difficult for Russia to attract these countries and re-integrate these countries into its own sphere of influence. At the present time, the top strategic priority for Russia is to deliberate how to maintain its influence in the CIS that have not yet fallen into the sphere of influence of NATO and the EU.